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Sutherland: Exploitation among Close Corporation Shareholders: A Philosophica

EXPLOITATION AMONG CLOSE CORPORATION
SHAREHOLDERS: A PHILOSOPHICAL CHANGE
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The somewhat unanticipated increase in the use of
the corporate form by small groups of entrepreneurs has
prompted questions concerning the feasibility of applying
traditional corporate law to private small business corporations, referred to as "closely held corporations." Although
the close corporation is clothed with corporate status, the
current view is that its actual operation and internal structure more closely resemble that of a partnership. Accordingly, the legislative and judicial reaction has been to foresake corporate law principles in favor of partnership law
standards when confronted with situations where close corporation shareholders take action adverse to the interests of
their partner-shareholders. The interjection of partnership
principles to corporate situations underscores the belief that
these specific problems cannot be resolved without affecting
traditional corporate frameworks and concepts.
This comment analyzes the various characteristics of a
closely held corporation and the application of partnership
law principles to such corporations in situations involving
corporation squeeze-outs. Current judicial and legislative
developments dealing with squeeze-outs and other oppressive
conduct are examined with particular emphasis accorded to
the fiduciary relationship existing among shareholders in a
close corporation setting.
DEFINING THE CLOSE CORPORATION

The most common corporate form in the United States
is the close corporation.' A close corporation will frequently
originate as a partnership or sole proprietorship.' By inCopyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming
1. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES § 1.01, at 1 n. 1 (1975).
2. Once the states chose to permit incorporation for any lawful business
purpose, many private enterprises formerly conducted as partnerships or
sole proprietorships "became the subject of corporate control and ownership." Ripin v. Atlantic Merchantile Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447, 98 N.E. 855,

(1912).
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corporating, the owners of such a business hope to gain the
advantages of the corporate form such as limited liability,
tax savings, free transferability of interests and perpetual
existence, while retaining the internal structure of the partnership or sole proprietorship.
Thus, in a close corporation there are typically a small
number of shareholders3 who, despite their corporate form,
continue to regard themselves as partners. These "partner"shareholders continue to actively participate in the day-today management of the enterprise.4 In doing so, they exercise
a substantially identical control of ownership and management.' This is in direct contrast with the conventional concept
of corporation law where the ownership and management of
a corporation are divided between the shareholders and the
board of directors.'
Due to their close working relationship, the shareholders
depend heavily on the cooperative efforts and mutual confidence of each other for the success of the enterprises.
"[B]ickering, corporate stalemates, and perhaps efforts to
achieve dissolution" will threaten the viability of the corporation.' To assure the succession in interest of persons
most likely to work harmoniously with the other shareholders, the close corporation will often restrict the transferability of its stock.8 Thus, close corporations reject the
To be eligible for Subchapter S treatment, which permits certain corporations to have their annual income taxed only to the shareholders and not
to the corporation, the corporation must limit the number of its share(Supp.
holders to fifteen. I.R.C. § 1373(a) (1), 26 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1)
However, some state statutes define a close corporation such
(1979).
that as many as thirty persons may hold stock in the corporation. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342(a) (1) (1974).
4. See, e.g., Cox, THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF CORPORATIONS § 13.100, at
79 (1973); HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 257 (2d ed. 1970); CARY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 362 (4th ed. 1969).
5. See, e.g., Thisted v. Tower Management Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 409 P.2d 813,
820 (1966) where the court defined a close corporation as one in which
the judgment of the directors is not independent from that of the shareholders.
6. In the conventional setting, shareholders elect the board of directors. The
directors manage the corporation by establishing corporate policy and
appointing officers to execute such policy. Inherent in such an approach is
the separation of ownership by the shareholers from management power
vested in the board of directors. HENN, supra note 4, at § 188.
7. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578,
328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (1975) (footnotes omitted). See also Cain v. Cain, 334
N.E.2d 650 (Mass. App. 1975).
8. Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59
YALE L. J. 1040, 1047-48 (1950).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/10
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corporate norm of free transferability of shares, often in
favor of the partnership model which requires the consent
of all existing partners for the admission of a new partner.'
Unlike public-issue corporation stock, close corporation
stock is not publicly traded'" and, due to share transfer
restrictions, it is not usually traded in the private sector.
It is therefore extremely difficult to determine the value of
close corporation stock. 1 As a result, close corporation
minority stock has a poor market value, if one at all.' 2 Consequently, the remedies available to minority interests in
public-issue corporations are not available to close corporation minority interests. A dissatisfied public-issue shareholder can sell his shares and recover his invested capital.
However, a dissenting close corporation shareholder has no
such remedy. "No outsider would knowingly assume the
position of the disadvantaged minority. To cut losses, the
minority stockholder may be compelled to deal with the
3
majority.'

'

CURRENT JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Due to these peculiarities, statutes and case law have
recently begun to recognize that close corporations may in
fact function upon an entirely different basis than publicissue corporations, and are therefore to be accorded distinct
treatment.' Recognition of the need for extraordinary treatment for closely held corporations is, in fact, recognition of
the need for an alteration in the conceptual framework of
corporate existence. For instance, in an appropriate case, a
court might not hold a close corporation to the strict for9. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(g).

10. The close corporation is not permitted to offer any of its stock which
11.

would constitute a "public offering" within the meaning of the UNITED
STATES SECURITIES ACT (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77a. et. seq. (1976).
HENN, supra note 4, at § 281.

12. CARY, 8upra note 4, at 469.
13. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., supra note 7, at 515; Galler v. Galler,

32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-584 (1965).
14.

"[T]here has been a defnite, albeit inarticulate, trend toward eventual
judicial treatment of the close corporation as 8ui generis." Galler v. Galler,
supra note 13, at 584. See also Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 806, 263
N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1965) (Fuld, J. dissenting).
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malities applicable to a public-issue corporation, and mere
irregularities may be permitted, at least where no fraud or
injury would be worked upon the public, minority interests
or creditors." The law has also become more tolerant of the
close corporation's departure from the principle of free
alienability of shares.'" This tolerance permits close corporation planners to provide for the necessary share transfer
restrictions.
However, the law has not always been so tolerant of
deviations from the statutory norm. All corporations were,
and to some extent still are, governed by the same statutory
provisions designed for public-issue corporations.1 7 A typical
and classic view was that
[t]he law never contemplated that persons engaged
in business as partners may incorporate, with intent to obtain the advantages and immunities of a
corporate form, and then, Proteus-like, become at
will a copartnership or a corporation, as the exigencies or purposes of their joint enterprise may
from time to time require.... They cannot be partners inter sese and a corporation as to the rest of
the world."8
However, the concept of the corporate entity as a separate
legal personality is not entirely valid. There appears to be
little question that, in many instances, a distinction has
been made between publicly held and closely held corporations."l
A growing number of states are adopting statutes
specifically designed to give special attention to the legit15. Folk, Corporation Law Development8-1969, 56 VA. L. REV. 755, 779
(1970).
16. Hornstein, supra note 8, at 1048. Cf. WYO. STAT. § 17-1-132 (1977)
(Transfer restrictions which do not unreasonably restrain alienation may
be adopted in the articles of incorporation, in the bylaws, or by agreement
among the shareholders).
17. CARY, supra note 4, at 15.
18. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592,.76A. 568, 571 (1910).
19. See, e.g., -Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941, 945
(Ind. App. 1978) (where the court recognized the principle of "incorporated
partnership").

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/10
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imate needs of close corporations."0 For instance, the statutes
will often permit the close corporation to confer management
authority directly on the shareholders, thus bypassing the
traditional role of the directors." Other states, including
Wyoming, have adopted the provisions of the Model Business
Corporation Act 2 which is said to provide sufficient flexibility for ease of creation and management of a close corporation without the problems often associated with the
statutory provisions designed specifically for the governing
of closely held corporations.2
MINIMUM

RIGHTS FOR CLOSE CORPORATION

PARTICIPANTS

It is apparent then, that for many purposes the close
corporation is not treated in the conventional manner, as a
mere entity with a personality unto itself, separate and
distinct from the individual shareholders. Although the close
corporation is clothed with corporate status, the current
view is that its actual operation and internal structure more
closely resembles that of a partnership with its attendant
strict fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence. Thus,
the fiduciary duties owed among close corporation members
are quite different and much more stringent than those owed
among the participants in a publicly held corporation.
Under traditional corporate theory, it has often been
held that a director or majority shareholder owes a fiduciary
obligation to the corporation. 4 Yet the courts have typically
been reluctant to hold that, absent special circumstances,25
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 10-201 to 10-218 (1977); CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 158, 186, 202(a), 204, 300, 418, 421, 706, 1111, 1201, 1800, 1904 (Deering
1977); DEL. CODE tit. 8, §§ 341 to 356 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§
1201 to 1216 (West Supp. 1980-1981); KAN. STAT. §§ 17-7201 to 17-7216
(Weeks 1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13A §§ 102(5), 701, 703 et. seq. (rev.
1974) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.200(101) et. seq., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 450.1101 et. seq. (1973); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAWS § 620 (McKinney, Supp.
1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1371
to 1386 (Purdon Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-51 (1969).
21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 351 (1974); MD. ANN. CODE tit. 4, § 4-301
(1975).
22. C.f., WYO. STAT. §§ 17-1-101 to 17-1-304 (1977).
23. Preface to 1969 revision of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT (stating
the position taken by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American
Bar Association).
24. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-307 (1939).
§ 5811
(rev. 1980).1981
Cyc.ofCORP.
25. 13
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there exists a fiduciary duty vis-a-vis the minority shareholders.2" Thus, a majority shareholder does not, merely
because of his stock ownership, owe a fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders.27 Even when a fiduciary relationship
has been held to exist, the duty imposed has been considerably
less than that imposed on partners and joint venturers.
Therefore, in the absence of some kind of control agreement
that affords each of the close corporation members special
protection, the members occupy a vulnerable position.
However, the trend now is to impose a fiduciary duty
among close corporation members that requires more than
merely acting at arm's length." "Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior."29 Accordingly, the courts have begun to foresake corporate law principles in favor of the stricter partnership standards in situations where close corporation shareholders take action adverse to the interests of their partnershareholders."
The 1975 decision, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New England,3 gave recognition by doctrinal innovation that the duty owed among close corporation members
is the same fiduciary duty that partners owe to one another.
There the Rodd Electrotype Co., a closely held corporation,
purchased shares from Harry Rodd, the former controlling
26. Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 164 (10th Cir. 1967) ("under applicable Wyoming law, a director does not stand in a fiducial relationship
to a shareholder with regard to his stock"); Comment, The Expanding
Scope of the Controlling Shareholder's Fiduciary Duty to the Minority
Shareholders: Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson and Company, U. ILL. L. F. 534
(1969).
27. See, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973); McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969) (Kansas law);
Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1967) (Wyoming law), cert.
denied 390 U.S. 948 (1968).
28. In Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 111, 460 P.2d 464, 473,
81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 601 (1969), Justice Traynor noted:
The increasingly complex transactions of the business and financial
communities demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional theories
of fiduciary obligation as tests of majority shareholder responsibility
to the minority. These theories have failed to afford adequate protection to minority shareholders and particularly to those in closely
held corporations ...
29. Courts often incorporate by reference the standard of duty applied to joint
venturers and partners, as elucidated by Chief Judge Cardozo in Meinhard
v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
30. Oppressive conduct within the close corporation is most often described
as a "freeze out" or "squeeze-out." ONEAL, supra note 1, § 1.01 at 1.
31. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, supra note 7.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/10
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stockholder. The plaintiff learned of the purchase and subsequently offered her shares for sale to the corporation at
the price paid to Rodd. When her offer was refused she
brought suit to rescind the purchase.
The court began its analysis by noting that because of
the small number of shareholders, the restricted market for
the shareholders' stock, the participation by the shareholders
in the management and operation of the business, and the
dependency of the shareholders on one another for the success
of the enterprise, "the close corporation bears striking resemblance to a partnership. ' 32 The court further observed
that minority close corporation shareholders are particularly
vulnerable to squeeze-outs and other oppressive conduct for
which there is no adequate remedy under the traditional
rules. 3' For instance, application of the majority rule doc-

trine would effectively assist the controlling shareholders
to eliminate the minority interests. The business judgment
rule would operate in a similar fashion; its effect would be
to sustain actions taken by the directors. Furthermore, the
close corporation shareholder's remedies are limited by the
unavailability of dissolution and the lack of a ready market
for close corporation securities. 4
These two themes, lack of adequate remedies and partner-like corporate citizenship, led the court to determine that
"stockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the
enterprise that partners owe to one another," rather than
"the somewhat less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to
which directors and shareholders of all corporations must
adhere. '3 1 The court then imposed the strict standard of

"utmost good faith and loyalty""0 and ruled that Rodd must
cause the corporation to offer each shareholder an equal
32.
33.
34.
35.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

512.
513-515.
514, 515.
515, 516 (footnotes omitted).
515.
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opportunity to sell his shares to the corporation at an identical price."
In addition to the stricter fiduciary standard, the Massachusetts court made another significant departure from the
traditional notion of corporate fiduciary duty by imposing
the strict standard on all members of close corporations,
without regard to status as a majority or minority shareholder, and without regard to official capacity as an officer
or director. 8 In doing so, the court implicitly made the practical observation that the usual close corporation setting
involves shareholders who also serve as officers and directors
-an individual will exercise management control as well
as ownership.
It should be understood that the Donahue facts do
not reveal an attempted freeze-out. Nevertheless, the court
ordered the corporation to offer the plaintiff an equal opportunity to sell her shares. It would seem that the court was
more concerned with the potential for oppression in a close
corporation, and that the holding was at least partially
motivated by a desire to protect other shareholders in future
cases.
While both the standard and the result of its application in Donahue are clear, its true import depends on judicial
application in subsequent cases. Later case law dealing with
squeeze-outs and other oppressive conduct is examined below
and explores the application of the Donahue standard in
squeeze-out situations.
37. Id. at 518. Other courts have also suggested the equal opportunity concept
as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duties involved in the sale of shares.
See, e.g., Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., supra note 28 at 473.
38. Accord: Comolli v. Comolli, 241 Ga. 471, 246 S.E.2d 278, 280-81 (1978)
(directors' action in causing corporation to purchase shares in the company
from the widow of one shareholder constituted a breach of duty owed to
all close corporation shareholders unless the director would authorize the
corporation to purchase the minority shareholder's interest on the same
terms); Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (minority
shareholder held to have violated a similarly defined duty by not renegotiating the purchase price contained in a buy-sell agreement with the majority

shareholder).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/10
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Donahue Progeny
One year after its Donahue decision, the Massachusetts
court decided Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 9 and
again indicated a willingness to break with traditional
concepts governing corporate behavior. After consulting an
attorney, Wilkes and his three partners organized a corporation under Massachusetts law. Each of the four partners
invested an equal amount of capital, and subscribed to an
equal number of shares in the corporation. At the time of
incorporation, it was understood that each owner would serve
as a director and would actively participate in the management of the corporation. It was also agreed that each would
share equally in the earnings. However, they did not enter
into a formal shareholders' agreement allocating control and
earnings.
Eventually, the relationship between Wilkes and the
other three shareholders deteriorated. As a consequence, the
controlling shareholders removed Wilkes from the board of
directors and discharged him from the company's employ.
There was no indication that the termination of Wilke's
employment was based on his misconduct or neglect of duties.
The court held that the majority shareholders had
breached their fiduciary duties owed to Wilkes. In doing so,
the court relied heavily on the prior Donahue decision and
again imposed the partnership standard of "utmost good
faith and loyalty."4 The court noted that Wilkes entered
the corporation with the expectation that he would continue
to actively participate in its affairs, and that the majority's
action effectively frustrated his expectation.4
Although the court recognized that the squeeze technique of depriving minority shareholders of corporate offices
and employment has been facilitated by the business judg39. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976).
40. Id. at 663, 665.
41. Id. at 662-663.
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ment rule,42 it nonetheless cautioned that the fiduciary stan4
dard is to be tempered with the business judgment rule.
The court felt that strict application of the fiduciary standard in situations such as this must be avoided and that a
balance must be struck between the majority's fiduciary
obligations and the majority's right to control the corporation. 4
The importance of the Wilkes decision cannot be overemphasized. Although the court did make an inquiry as to
whether the majority could demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for their action, it did not exhibit the traditional
reluctance to closely examine the business judgment of the
directors, such as the selection and retention or dismissal of
officers, directors and employees.'
Under conventional corporation law, the squeezed minority shareholder must bear the burden of proving that the
controlling shareholders or the directors have acted improperly." However, in Wilkes, the burden was shifted to the
majority to show a legitimate business purpose. 7 Only a
showing of actual misconduct by an "undesirable individual
bent on injuring or destroying the corporation" would justify
the majority's action of removing a minority shareholder
8
from his corporate directorship and employment."
Conceivably, the court's decision was influenced by the
fact that although the shareholders had an understanding
42. Id. at 662. See, BALLANTINE, CORPORATION § 231 (rev. ed. 1946) wherein
it is said that "courts hesitate to substitute their judgment on complicated
questions of business policy for that of the elected managers of the business
and have limited the scope of judicial review which they are willing to
undertake." This lack of judicial participation works as a barrier to the
granting of relief to squeezed shareholders. O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 3.03 at
59.
43. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., supra note 39, at 663.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 662. Other modern courts have also demonstrated a tendency to
limit the scope of the business judgment rule. See Cramer v. General
Telephone & Electronics Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert.
denied 439 U.S. 1129 (1978).
46. See, e.g., Waldrop v. Martin, 237 Ala. 556, 188 So. 59, 62 (1939).
47. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., supra note 39 at 663, 664. The
shifting of the burden is entirely consistent with partnership principles.
When there is a question of breach of a fiduciary duty of a managing
partner all doubt will be resolved against him, and he has the burden
of proving his innocence. Bovy v. Graham, Cohen and Wampold, 17 Wash.
App. 567, 564 P.2d 1175. 1178 (1977); Conrad v. Judson 465 S.Wa.2d 819,
828 (Ct. App. 1971).
48. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., supra note 39, at 664.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/10
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that control and earnings were to be shared equally, they
did not enter into a formal shareholders' agreement providing for equality. Poor planning for close corporations is a
frequent situation, and often provides a legally sanctioned
blueprint for squeeze-outs.4" While nothing can replace adequate planning and the foresight to write protective provisions into the corporate charter, bylaws or shareholders'
agreements, Wilkes offers a second protection to assist the
shareholder by protecting the reasonable expectations of the
parties.50
However, to look to the parties' expectations is contrary
to the Donahue assumption that a relationship of "trust and
confidence" exists in all close corporations. Thus, Donahue
defined a duty applicable to all close corporation shareholders,
regardless of the existence of other factors. Nevertheless,
Wilkes teaches us that there are instances where the imposition of duties analogous to those owed by partners may violate
the intentions of the parties.
The reasoning in Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp.5 1
closely parallels that of Wilkes. Both avoided the Donahue
assumption that the strict fiduciary relationship arises in
all corporations that are closely held; again the inference
being that imposition of the partnership concept may, in
some situations, be contrary to the intention of the shareholders. 2
The Cressy v. Shannon litigants, each a principal shareholder, had failed to disclose to the other the availability of
outstanding shares for purchase and to afford the opportunity to share in the purchase of such stock. The court
looked to the expectations of the parties and found that they
49. O'NEAL, supra note 1 § 2.17 at 48-50.
50. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., supra note 39, at 662-664. See
also O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 7.15 at 523: "Closely related to the notion that
a close corporation is similar to a partnership and in many respects should
be governed by the same rules is the idea that at least some close corporations are companies based on personal relationships that give rise to expectations that the courts should protect."
51. Cressy v. Shannon Continental Corp., 378 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. App. 1978).
52. "We do not suggest the relationship arises a fortiori in a corporation involving few shareholders. Such parties may well intend to do business
with the world and among themselves strictly in accord with the norms of

general corporation law." Id. at 945, n. 6.
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had intended an equal division of ownership and control.53
The intention to commit themselves equally to the enterprise
was held to be analogous to the partnership expectation of
equality, and therefore the stricter partnership duty was
imposed.54
The difficulty associated with determining intent is
compounded because of the need to determine which fiduciary
duty should be applied. The problem is well illustrated in
Johns v. Caldwell,5 a case dealing with a double squeeze-out
situation involving all three of the corporation's shareholders. 6 The majority shareholders, Johns and Caldwell,
had for some years controlled the corporation in a contemptible manner, without regard for Moore, the minority shareholder. Finally Moore could endure no more and decided to
sell his stock. He made an offer to Caldwell, but neither
informed Johns of the offer. Once Johns did learn of the
offer, he brought action to prevent the sale or, in the alternative, to require that the sale of Moore's stock be equally
divided among Johns and Caldwell.
Johns alleged that he and Caldwell had always operated
the business as a partnership; therefore, there should exist
a strict fiduciary relationship. 7 However, the court determined that the business functioned not as a partnership,
but as a corporation. It was characterized as such since it
had performed the necessary formalities associated with
corporate demeanor. 9 The traditional rule was then applied,
that a shareholder may dispose of his stock as he pleases.6"
Accordingly, judgment was rendered in favor of Caldwell
and Moore.
53. Id. at 943, 945.
54. Id. at 945.
55. Johns v. Caldwell, 601 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn. App. 1980).

56. The stock distribution was as follows: Johns-45%, Caldwell-45%, Moore
57.

-10%.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 41.

58. Id.
59. "Directors' meetings have been held, minutes have been kept, corporate
tax returns have been filed and dividends have been declared.
these actviities are indicative of a corporate form of business." Id.

All of

60. Id. at 42, citing State ex. rel. Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc.,
211 Tenn. 107, 362 S.W.2d 787 (1962).
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It is the author's opinion that whether a corporation
performs the necessary corporate rituals is irrelevant to the
issue of duty owed. All corporations, regardless of their
nature, are required to conduct meetings, keep minutes and
file tax returns. The court's reliance on these incidents was
misplaced. A more proper inquiry would be whether the
shareholders had regarded themselves as partners. Thus, in
Johns the issue of intent should have been explored more
thoroughly before the court could determine whether the
duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty" was applicable."
However, the question arises whether it is necessary or
even helpful for a court to determine the parties' intentions
before deciding which standard shall apply. It is arguable
that while the imposition of a strict fiduciary duty analogous
to that owed by partners may exceed the intentions of the
parties, this approach may be justified as a matter of policy.
The courts' application of the stricter duty in a close corporation setting would be more certain and less costly than
an approach which would attempt to assess the nature of
the relationship between the close corporation participants
after an examination of all the circumstances surrounding
its creation, development and breakdown. Were the rule
otherwise, the issue of intent would often have to be litigated
before it is apparent whether the stricter duty applies at all.
However, the effect of a rule imposing the fiduciary
relationship on unwilling and unsuspecting parties without
regard for their expectations would be patently unfair and
somewhat tyrannical. Perhaps a more satisfactory solution
would be for the courts to develop a system of logic based
on the rights as well as the expectations of those people
associated with the close corporation. Such a methodology
would offer sufficient flexibility to apply, in appropriate
situations, not only to the close corporation shareholders,
but also to certain third parties who deal with the corporation.
61. Similarly, other courts deal with the issue of duty owned by close corporation shareholders by determining on an ad hoc basis the nature of the
shareholders' relationship. See, e.g., Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307
Minn. 344, 240 N.W.2d 507, 512 (1976) where the court ruled that the
is a question
relationship
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By definition, the third party would not be in a position
to assert his membership in the personal relationships deserving of the courts' protection. Yet without the protection
of strict fiduciary duties, the outsider may find himself on
2
no
the short end of a scheme to "milk the big cow"" -with
remedy available. The third party would be protected only
in those instances where the court chooses to look to his
rights and expectations and expand the fiduciary relationship to cover outside interests.
Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye"3 is such a case. The close
corporation held an option to repurchase the shares of a
deceased holder at fair market value. The corporation exercised its option and negotiated a price with the deceased's
representative without disclosing that another company was
negotiating to purchase the corporation for a high price. The
defendants argued in favor of the traditional rule requiring
common law fraud. However, the court held that it was not
necessary to show fraud since there existed a strict fiduciary
relationship among the shareholders. 4 The court further
determined that the fiduciary duty did not die with Ritter,
the deceased, but survived to his personal representative,
the plaintiff.65
The traditional corporate practice is to think in terms
of rights attaching to shares of stock instead of to people.
The compelling need and logic for rights to be enjoyed by
those people who participate in or deal with a close corporation cannot be understated. The following section is illustrative of the trend to shape workable remedies such that the
rights afforded may be protected.
Judicial Remedies for Oppression
By not insisting on appropriate protective provisions
written into the corporate charter, bylaws or shareholders'
62. Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 426 F. Supp. 908, 912 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 914. Applicable partnership principles similarly create a duty to
disclose to the co-partner all matters necessarily affecting the partnership
business even if no demand is made for the information. Libby v. L. J.
Corp., 247 F.2d 78, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
65. Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 8upra note 62 at 913.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/10
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agreement, a close corporation participant often places himself in a precarious position, vulnerable to squeeze-out or
oppression."0 Although the courts have generally been somewhat conservative in shaping remedies for oppressed close
corporation shareholders, 7 steps have been taken to provide
relief.
In particular, there has been a noticeable improvement
in the shaping of relief where the majority has squeezed the
minority by the common technique of withholding payment
of dividends over a long period of time. Of course, if the
minority can prove that dividends were withheld solely to
effect a freeze-out, a court might compel the declaration of
dividends." But that remedy is not entirely satisfactorilyonce the dividend has been declared, there is usually nothing
to prevent the majority from repeating the offense. If convinced that repeated offenses are likely, courts will sometimes liquidate the corporation; but they hesitate to do so
because of the economic waste involved in forced liquidations,
particularly in the case of a solvent corporation.7"
A Michigan appellate court upheld a unique decree
designed to relieve minority shareholders of the necessity
of repeatedly bringing successive suits in order to obtain
dividends.' The court stated that it could compel the payment of dividends if the directors' refusal to do so constituted
a breach of fiduciary duty." In determining whether dividends should be declared, the court gave considerable atten66. Close corporation shareholders have a means of protection not available
to public-issue corporation shareholders. They may limit by way of
private agreement the power of the controlling shareholders to exercise
unilateral control of the corporation or they may guarantee the minority
a return on its investment. See Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d
577 (1964); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936). Even
so, it is impossible for even the most conscientious business planner to foresee the infinite variety of squeezes and guard against each squeeze
technique.
67. O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 9.05 at 588.
68. The majority shareholders will often attempt to escape the hardships
associated with the withholding of dividends by increasing the compensation paid to themselves as employees of the corporation. O'NEAL, supra
note 1, § 3.07 at 86.
69. See Morrison v. State Bank of Wheatland, 58 Wyo. 138, 126 P.2d 793 (1942)
where the court ruled that it does have the power to declare dividends
where the directors act fraudulently, oppressively or unreasonably.
70. CARY, supra note 4, at 483.
71. Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977).
72. Id. at 771.
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tion to the company's profits and future needs, but placed
special emphasis on the fact that the close corporation directors were also corporate officers receiving compensation. As
such, they were not in a position to make an impartial
decision as to whether a dividend should be declared.7" The
court then ordered dividends to be paid for the previous five
years and retained jurisdiction for the subsequent five year
period in the event the defendants would continue to wrongfully withhold the payment of dividends."4
Another squeeze technique requiring an extraordinary
remedy is that of removing a shareholder from his positions
of employment and management. A close corporation shareholder will typically invest a substantial portion of his personal resources in the enterprise, and will depend exclusively on the corporation for his employment and income.7"
If excluded from employment, the shareholder is effectively
denied a return on his investment. 6
Such was the situation in Hallahan v. Haltom Corp."
Four shareholders with equal interests in the corporation
caused it to issue a small number of shares to a fifth person
as partial payment for work he performed. Before the fifth
person received his shares, he signed a proxy in favor of
Thompson, one of the original owners. Thereafter a dispute
divided the four original shareholders into two factions. The
Thompson faction used the proxy to terminate the employment of the two opposing shareholders. The court ruled that
the peremptory discharge violated the fiduciary duty owed
among close corporation shareholders. 8 Redemption of the
fifth person's shares was ordered, thereby restoring the
corporate structure originally envisioned. 9
In an unusual and interesting case, Atkinson v. Mar0 the Supreme Court of Arizona readily disregarded
quart,"
73. Id. at 770.
74. Id. at 775. The court relied on Patton v. Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279
S.W.2d 848 (1955) where the minority shareholder was granted a similar
remedy.
75. O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 3.06 at 78.
76. Id.
77. Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 385 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. App. 1979).
78. Id. at 1034.
79. Id. at 1035.
80. Atkinson v. Marquart, 112 Ariz. 304, 541 P.2d 556 (1975).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/10
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the separate legal personality of the corporation in order to
grant effective relief to a close corporation shareholder.
Atkinson and Marquart had converted their partnership
into corporate form and continued to engage in the business
of custom rifle manufacture and repair. Several years later
Atkinson began a competing business and falsely represented
to his customers that the corporation could no longer make
and repair custom rifles.
Atkinson was found liable, not to the corporation, but
to Marquart personally. Citing Pearlman v. Feldmann,8 the
court determined that any judgment in favor of the corporation would also benefit Atkinson, the wrongdoer. Therefore,
Marquart was entitled to recover in his own right instead
of through the corporation.
The Superior Court of New Jersey extended the doctrine by permitting a close corporation shareholder personal
recovery without qualification." The court recognized the
traditional principle that a shareholder has no individual
claim for loss in value of his investment resulting from
actions taken by a director.8 3 However, the court ruled that
the relationship of the principals was that of partners or
coventurers.8 4 Accordingly, application of the conventional
rule was found to be unjustified since the corporate personality was not separate from its shareholders.85 The court
then pierced the corporate veil and held the defendant liable
to the plaintiff personally. 6
It appears that the courts' reasoning in this category
of cases may very well rest on the parties' expectations.
When one or more of the close corporation members reaches
the conclusion that he or she has been wronged and seeks a
judicial remedy for that wrong, it is not difficult to comprehend the frustration felt when they discover it is not they,
81. Pearlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2nd Cir. 1955).
82. 68th Street Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d
78 (1976).
83. Id. at 84.
84. Id. at 85.
85. Id. at 84.
86. Cf., Peters Grazing Ass'n. v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 449 (Wyo. 1975), reh.
denied 546 P.2d 189 (1976) (given appropriate circumstances, the corporate
be stripped
away Scholarship,
and the individuals
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individually, who have been wronged, but rather the corporation. Therefore, often to the surprise of the parties, only
the corporation may recover for the wrong.
An additional remedy that should not be overlooked is
that of punitive damages. In Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 7 the
plaintiff and defendant formed a corporation and issued
1,000 shares of capital stock. The defendant received all
1,000 shares but, pursuant to a prior agreement, gave to
the plaintiff an option to purchase 501 of the 1,000 shares.
However, before plaintiff had exercised his option, the defendant caused the issuance of 14,700 additional shares to himself and his wife. Several weeks later the defendant dishonored plaintiff's option, and informed plaintiff of the
additional shares which would diminish his interest in the
corporation.
The court ordered the defendant to convey the 501
shares of stock to plaintiff and caused the corporation to
rescind the additional 14,700 shares. In addition, the plaintiff was awarded punitive damages. Despite a vigorous dissenting opinion, 8 the court reasoned that punitive damages
are proper where relief other than money damage is sought.8 "
Involuntary Dissolution for Oppression
Another method for providing relief to oppressed shareholders is that of dissolution. However, under traditional
corporate doctrines, dissolution is available only in limited,
specified conditions and, in any case, is considered to be a
drastic remedy."° But dissolution of a partnership is much
more simple and flexible, the rule being that any partner
may dissolve the enterprise at will."' Although legal scholars
have long advocated increased use of involuntary dissolution
procedures, the courts have generally been reluctant to dis87. Nash v. Craigco, Inc.,.585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978).
88. Id. at 780 (dissenting opinion): "Punitive damages are contrary to the
principles of equity jurisprudence, for equity abhors a penalty or forfeiture
and seeks to restore the parties to their status quo." (Footnotes omitted).
89. Id. at 777. See also 68th Street Apartments, Inc. v. Lauricella, supra note
82, at 89 (if close corporation shareholders act in a malicious and unjustified manner, they shall be liable for punitive damages).
90. See generally Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems
of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 778, 778 (1952).
91. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31.
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solve a corporation, sensing that termination of a formerly
viable concern is not to be taken lightly. 2
A majority of the states, including Wyoming, now have
statutes which give to the courts power to grant dissolution
upon a showing of oppression or comparable grounds, such
as deadlock, fraud or illegality.9" Notwithstanding the broad
statutory power, dissolution continues to be discretionary:
whether the case presented involves deadlock 4 or oppression,9" the courts are still hesitant to decree the dissolution of
a solvent corporation.
As difficult as corporate dissolution may be, it is somewhat more available to a dissident close corporation shareholder. The notion that a close corporation resembles a
partnership is an important factor in the more liberal view."
The analogy between close corporations and partnerships
would imply that the right to corporate dissolution, like the
partner's right of liquidation, must be unconditional. Professor Hetherington suggests that
Personal relations [within the close corporation]
may become so unsatisfactory that no amount of
commercial success is adequate recompense. Only
the participants can judge when continuation of
an association becomes intolerable. Denial of the
right to withdraw on reasonable terms forces upon
the minority the choice of continuing an unacceptable association, or in effect abandoning its investment. The lack of reasonable alternatives compels
a continuation of the association by legal constraint
-what was once called "togetherness by injuction"
which scarcely seems a desirable policy
-a prospect
97
goal.
92. Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to The Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1, 27
(1977).
93. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-614 (1977).
94. In re Radom & Neidorff, 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (1954) (the
court refused to grant dissolution even where deadlock as defined in the
statute was shown to exist).

95. In Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387,
395, 398 (1973), the appellate court agreed that the defendant's conduct
had been oppressive, but nevertheless declined to order dissolution.

96. Weiss v. Gordon, 32 App. Div.2d 279, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842 (1969).
97. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close
(1969).
U. of
IL.Wyoming
L. F. 1, 29
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Yet it seems that the courts are entirely proper in their
refusal to liberalize dissolution where other equitable relief
is available. The granting of relief for breach of fiduciary
duty would be much less drastic than dissolution, and the
concept that an operative corporation should not be dissolved if otherwise avoidable would be preserved.
Perhaps most important, however, a potential source
of much needed risk capital for close corporation shareholders would be threatened by a liberalized dissolution procedure. Upon dissolution, the investments made by outside
investors, creditors and close corporation participants may
be adversely affected. Undoubtedly, if dissolution decrees
were to be granted as a matter of course, these persons
would choose to invest their money elsewhere.
CONCLUSION

The more conventional remedies have generally failed
to provide close corporation shareholders any real protection.
Thus, the trend now is to apply a broad protective standard
allowing the courts to meet the variety of situations encountered in close corporation squeeze-out cases. The partnership-like standard of utmost good faith and loyalty is
mandated by the peculiarities of close corporation life and
the unavailability of remedies for close corporation participants.
There is a noticeable tendency for the courts to avoid
indiscriminate application of the business judgment rule to
sustain action taken by close corporation directors. By eliminating the judicial reluctance to question the internal business practices of an enterprise, the courts are able to intervene when necessary to protect close corporation shareholders
against oppressive action even though fraud or bad faith
cannot be shown. Similarly, the. traditional principle of
majority rule is often found. to be less stringently applied
to closely held corporations. It is hoped that the growing
availability of relief will-temper oppressive action. While
protection should be afforded the individual shareholder,
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perhaps a more important consideration is the economic
benefit attributable to the imposition of the strict fiduciary
duty.
The issue arises, however, whether the contemporary
approach presents an unnecessary conflict between corporate
norms and corporate conduct. The normative offerings include limited liability, perpetual existence and other attractions for those considering incorporation. The possibility
must be considered that indiscriminate interjection of partnership law into the corporate area might conceivably bifurcate or dilute the corporate norms needlessly.
A more workable and appealing alternative to the bifurcation of the corporate norms must deal with the prospect
of removing closely held corporations from the corporate
scheme altogether. If the bifurcated system is retained, care
must be exercised not to indiscriminately accord extraordinary treatment such that the normative offerings will
suffer adversely.
ROD K. SUTHERLAND
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